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Summary
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUS-
TAH) stands out from other UN peacekeeping missions, 
which have focused on responding to situations of violent 
conflict. In Haiti there is no violent conflict as such: the 
problems are lack of political confluence, lack of respect 
for agreements, and an inability to compromise. In con-
trast to the loud national-level narrative extremely criti-
cal of MINUSTAH, at local levels the UN mission has often 
been the only available link to the national government 
and international organizations present in remote areas.
While the UN and its Civil Affairs (CA) section are doing 
an important job in Haiti, it is important to leverage the 
presence of the UN throughout Haiti to realize substantial 
and tangible peacebuilding and development dividends 
that can benefit local populations, and to engage more 
strongly with non-state actors and NGOs. A key challenge 
is to give local populations the possibility to participate in 
local and national politics. 
The research team also noted that politics was seen as 
business as usual, and ‘the mission was seen to be protect-
ing a power set and not facilitating a national dialogue’.1 
In part, this was due to lack of responsiveness on the part 
of the mission and other international actors as to the role 
they might be able to play in enabling non-state actors 
outside the capital to have a voice. That should be a focus 
area for the UN and other actors when they start on the 
transition process of phasing out the mission.
This policy brief is based on a recent NUPI report that 
has looked at how the UN is undertaking local-level 
early peacebuilding, focusing on the efforts of the UN 
DPKO Civil Affairs section in Haiti.2 The rationale 
for making the connection between Civil Affairs and 
local-level peacebuilding is grounded in the evolving 
understanding that ‘peacekeepers are peacebuilders’3 
and should implement early peacebuilding tasks.4  In 
peacekeeping missions, the Civil Affairs section is 
most frequently deployed throughout the host country, 
providing the UN with a presence on the local level. 
MINUSTAH has over 100 Civil Affairs officers (CAOs) 
deployed across Haiti’s ten departments, working on 
a daily basis with national, departmental and local-
level officials. Through the Civil Affairs section, MI-
NUSTAH has a reach throughout Haiti impossible 
to match by any UN agency or NGO. In the words of 
one CAO, it ‘can feel the temperature on the ground’.5  
This proximity has led to privileged relations and trust 
with local authorities, enabling civil affairs to voice the 
needs and concerns of local officials to central authori-
2   Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud (2012). ‘UN and local 
peacebuilding and transition in Haiti’. Security in Practice 4, 
2012. Oslo, NUPI.
3 United Nations 2012. Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of 
United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: Strategy. UN 
DPKO and DFS, New York: p. 10.  
4 As defined by the Secretary-General in his opening remarks 
of the Security Council discussion on peacebuilding, 13 October 
2010 (UN 2010), where he stressed that peacekeeping missions 
should be enabled ‘to have an impact as “early peacebuilders”’. 
The meeting in the Security Council was held to discuss the lat-
est Progress Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict (UN 2010).
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ties. Local authorities we spoke with – from all levels 
– were aware of the role of Civil Affairs, and could dis-
tinguish between different MINUSTAH sections and 
identify their CA focal points. 
There are obvious advantages in the fact that over 
90% of the senior CA staff have over five years with-
in MINUSTAH, thereby providing the mission with 
considerable contextual knowledge and institutional 
memory. On the other hand, this also results in a static 
staffing structure, with the danger of settling into rou-
tines rather than responding to changing needs and 
demands on the ground. Although Civil Affairs have 
successful experiences in bringing together non-state 
actors, as through the ‘town hall meetings’ during 
Haitian presidential elections, the section recognized 
that its support had focused mainly on local authori-
ties, and that it was necessary to extend this support to 
the various non-state actors so important to the social 
fabric of the country. State coverage is minimal, with 
most of Haiti’s governance and rule of law institutions 
either totally absent or inefficient, leaving the respon-
sibility for public service delivery largely to non-state 
actors, INGOs and businesses.6 In the future, these 
non-state actors must be taken more seriously by MI-
NUSTAH in the institutional building framework.
With the extensive presence that MINUSTAH has es-
tablished in Haiti, there also follows a promise of leav-
ing something tangible behind. MINUSTAH has been 
undertaking a large number of quick impact projects 
(QIPs) – refurbishing and building offices for mu-
nicipality officers, courts, marketplaces and so forth. 
Technical assistance to implement QIPs has become 
a central element in the work of CAOs in Haiti, due 
to the time-consuming element and visibility of such 
projects. When we spoke with CAOs, they counted 
their achievements in terms of buildings, infrastruc-
ture, establishing archives or even organigrammes al-
most as frequently as did the local authorities.
While these results of QIPs are important prerequi-
sites for the effective functioning of local authorities, 
they do not indicate how the local authorities are actu-
ally performing in their key role: of responding to the 
needs of their communities, including basic service 
delivery. The focus on material support through QIPs 
may be only a bias from the limited number of re-
spondents or due to the limited time that the research 
team spent on the ground, but it should still give some 
pause for thought. In the aftermath of the crippling 
earthquake, MINUSTAH has focused on QIPs as 
a means to provide tangible support, expanding the 
budget for QIPs from about $3 million to the current 
$7.5 million per year for QIPs. In addition, the mis-
sion has other resources that can be used for support 
– in total around $3 million, as well as various mission 
assets that to some degree can be used for mutually 
beneficial purposes, like repairing roads that are criti-
cal for the mission. 
CAOs often underscored that their presence through-
out the country enables them to feel the pulse of the 
country. While this is true, we also think that they 
may underestimate the expectations that their pres-
ence may raise among local populations. The breadth 
of the UN presence is impressive, but the scope and 
depth of their activities is less so. The focus on QIPs 
absorbs much valuable staff time with limited returns. 
It is understandable that officers want to leave some 
tangible structures behind, but these should be cou-
pled with more long-term activities that could ensure a 
sustainable approach that couples tangible structures 
with capacity development. 
In general, CA tended to engage with local authority 
counterparts more than with non-state actors. Good 
collaboration with local authorities often hinged on 
the presence of a mayor who would have a plan for 
development for his or her region.7 It was acknowl-
edged that, in many cases, involvement with local ac-
tors did not run deep enough – CA would relay the 
challenges that the local authorities had encountered, 
and ‘not the main challenges to the communities as 
such’.8  Among CSOs there was also a similar problem 
of representation. Civil society organizations would 
claim to be representative of the local communities 
and various causes, but were often perceived by Civil 
Affairs as having been set up merely to respond to the 
availability of QIPs and other funding. A mapping in 
one region indicated that there were many such com-
munity-based organizations, but these were very small 
and recently established. Organizations in rural areas 
were seen as less supply-driven than those in urban 
areas. Churches were also seen as heading initiatives 
perceived as enjoying greater legitimacy among the 
population.9 Some of our CA interlocutors also felt it 
more important to engage with political parties on the 
local level than with CSOs. The challenges facing CA 
when engaging with civil society and other local ac-
tors are many and complex. Common problems are 
the pervasive lack of capacity, supply-driven orienta-
tion of activities, lack of broad engagement with non-
state actors, and lack of community ownership of local 
CSOs and their activities. Civil Affairs must do better 
in channelling local voices into national policy proc-
esses. We acknowledge that this is a tall order, but as 
CA are the ones who are present across Haiti, and with 
a mandate for enabling local voices to be heard in the 
national processes, this should be a key item on the 
agenda forward. This will necessitate a broader and 
more systematic engagement with civil society, the 
6 See e.g. World Bank (2006), Haiti Social Resilience and State Fra-
gility in Haiti: A Country Social Analysis, 27 April 2006.
7 Interview with CAO.
8   Ibid.
9 Ibid.
3churches and other local actors. Greater effort should 
also be put into strengthening the capacity of local ac-
tors to contribute to policy-making processes on the 
local and national levels. 
The UN is working diligently to improve the lives of 
Haitians, but these efforts have encountered signifi-
cant challenges as regards coordination and coopera-
tion with the rest of the UN system and other devel-
opment actors. The UN mission has moved the CA 
section from the political to the development pillar, to 
ensure that the work of civil affairs and the commen-
surate outputs are in line with the longer-term peace-
building and development objectives of Haiti. As yet, 
however, this administrative reshuffling has not had 
tangible results in terms of improved cooperation be-
tween civil affairs and other UN funds, programmes 
and agencies. This is a challenge not only of coordina-
tion, but also of leveraging the presence of CA and UN 
mission assets throughout Haiti to realize substantial 
and tangible peacebuilding and development divi-
dends that can benefit local populations. MINUSTAH 
has met significant challenges in this area that must 
be overcome if it is to continue to prove relevant to 
Haitian stakeholders, on the national as well as the lo-
cal levels.
Recommendations
1.	 Institutional	support	and	supporting	participation	
in	national	policy	processes
– Member states, MINUSTAH and other actors 
should continue to press for legal reforms for es-
tablishing a viable framework for support to decen-
tralization and local government, institutionalizing 
and securing the progress made so far;  
– Notwithstanding the absence of a legal framework, 
MINUSTAH and the rest of the UN system should 
continue their important work in capacity develop-
ment for local government officials along the lines 
of the training offered to municipal accountants;
– Future legal reform will need to tackle, inter alia, 
the difficult issue of possible duplicative structures 
on local levels.
2.	 QIPs	and	programme	activities	 
– MINUSTAH should, with reference to the policy 
directive on QIPs and the UN Secretary-General’s 
report on civilian capacities,10 consider using more 
funds for capacity development activities for local 
officials, in close collaboration with the Ministry of 
Interior and Territorial Collectivities, civil society, 
UNDP and other relevant stakeholders;
– QIPs are very time-consuming, so there should be 
a focus on pooling similar QIPs in order to lower 
the transaction costs;
– Staff should be trained in development program-
ming, and a closer partnership with UNDP and 
other development agencies should be fostered, es-
pecially since these actors are currently co-located 
in the capital.
3.	 Local	ownership	and	engaging	with	non-state		
actors   
– While Civil Affairs is recognized by local authori-
ties as the ‘best in class’ in terms of listening to 
local needs, it is important to strengthen the par-
ticipatory approach further, e.g. through town hall 
meetings to ensuring that other voices also are 
heard and able to participate in national decision-
making processes;
– Having a core mandate of feeding local voices 
into national policy processes, Civil Affairs should 
make a more sustained effort in engaging with and 
strengthening the capacity of a broader representa-
tion of local actors, including various civil society 
organizations and churches;
– Recalling the g7+ declaration,11 there is a need to 
pay more attention to national planning frame-
works and needs, on the national, departmental 
and local levels, for instance by supporting the ta-
ble de concertation and the rule-of-law clusters as 
decision-making forums for all peacebuilding and 
development actors.  
4.	 The	UN	and	local	level	peacebuilding
– The Civil Affairs’ workload should be trimmed, e.g. 
through limiting the use of QIPs;  
– The UN should consider the model of South Su-
dan– of including posts with responsibility for pro-
gramme activities and opening the field presences 
for other peacebuilding and development actors;  
– Strengthen planning for early peacebuilding 
among relevant staff in MINUSTAH, including 
CA through a joint planning exercise with the UN 
country team;
– Operationalize existing integration in planning 
frameworks such as the Integrated Strategic Frame-
work (ISF) into programme activities executed on 
the local level;
– Consider a 24-month transition window in the 
handover of programme activities from MINUS-
TAH to the UN country team;  
– Pool resources for programme activities by focus-
ing QIPs on essential tasks and transferring funds 
to capacity-development initiatives that can be initi-
ated with reference to the SG guidance on civilian 
capacities;
– Devise a strategy together with UN DPKO New 
York on how to achieve staff mobility on senior lev-
els.
10 UNSG (2011). Civilian Capacity in the aftermath of Conflict, 
S/2011/527 (19 August 2011).
11 g7+ (2010) The Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding. Paris, International Dialogue for Peacebuild-
ing and Statebuilding, OECD. The g7+ is an open group of coun-
tries and regions experiencing conflict and fragility, now consist-
ing of 19 countries.
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